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Concerns about the societal impact of AI-based services and systems has encouraged governments and
other organisations around the world to propose AI policy frameworks to address fairness, accountability,
transparency and related topics. To achieve the objectives of these frameworks, the data and software engineers
who build machine-learning systems require knowledge about a variety of relevant supporting tools and
techniques. In this paper we provide an overview of technologies that support building trustworthy machine
learning systems, i.e., systems whose properties justify that people place trust in them. We argue that
four categories of system properties are instrumental in achieving the policy objectives, namely fairness,
explainability, auditability and safety & security (FEAS). We discuss how these properties need to be considered
across all stages of the machine learning life cycle, from data collection through run-time model inference. As
a consequence, we survey in this paper the main technologies with respect to all four of the FEAS properties,
for data-centric as well as model-centric stages of the machine learning system life cycle. We conclude with
an identification of open research problems, with a particular focus on the connection between trustworthy
machine learning technologies and their implications for individuals and society.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a proliferation of research in technologies for trustworthy machine learning
as well as in policy frameworks that introduce requirements around fairness, human rights, privacy
and other properties of AI-based services [2]. When building AI-based services, systems and
products, the challenge data, software and system engineers face is to design systems that deliver
the societal quality objectives articulated in the policy frameworks. In this paper, we consider this
challenge in building AI-based systems specifically with respect to machine learning technologies.
We do this through a survey that considers technologies for trustworthy machine learning in
relation to emerging policy frameworks.
To set the stage, we review and discuss a set of prominent policy frameworks for AI. Such policy
frameworks are emerging in many nations, jurisdictions and organisations, to respond to societal
concerns about the impact of AI on the quality of life of individuals and on our society, for instance
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in terms of fairness and justice. There is a noticeable and understandable gap between the subject
of the discourse in AI policy frameworks and that of technical approaches in the machine learning
literature. Typical concerns in the policy frameworks are expressed in terms such as ethics, justice,
fairness, accountability and transparency. These do not map one-to-one to properties of trustworthy
systems. (Here, the term trustworthy indicates the existence of system properties that justify parties
to place trust in the system [8]).
We argue that the policy framework objectives can be implemented through four key properties of
trustworthy machine learning systems: Fairness, Explainability, Auditability and Safety & Security
(FEAS). The survey provides an encompassing view of machine learning technologies available
with respect to each of the FEAS properties. Of course, each FEAS property deserves its own
literature review, the objective in this paper is to highlight the main characteristics and types
of approaches for each property to provide a sounds foundation for machine learning systems
engineering research and development. To further maintain a reasonable scope, within the safety
& security category the emphasis is on security and privacy, more so than on safety, reliability and
similar concerns.
To build trustworthy machine learning systems, one needs to incorporate concerns about trust-
worthiness in all stages of the design, from data collection strategies to algorithm selection and
visualisation of results. Similarly, these should be considered in all life cycle stages, including design,
development and deployment. We use the chain of trust, introduced in [214], to illustrate and discuss
the dependencies between stages of the system design and life cycle. In particular, we organise our
survey in two classes, Data-Centric Trustworthiness (data collection, pre–processing and feature
engineering) and Model-Centric Trustworthiness (model training, testing and inference).
We conclude the paper with a discussion of open problems in building trustworthy machine
learning systems. The open problems concentrates on the main research required to establish an
implementation pathway for machine-learning based systems to fulfil qualities emerging from the
AI policy framework. The future research considers both technology and socio-technical research
questions.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the relationship between emerging
policy framework for AI and the four technology FEAS properties. Section 3 the introduces the
various stages in the system life cycle at which trustworthiness is to be considered, based on the
chain of trust. Section 4 sets the stage for the discussion of FEAS technologies by identifying
challenges in trustworthy machine learning and introducing definitions and ways to assess the
properties. The core of the survey is in the next two section, first surveying data-centric technologies
in Section 5 and then model-centric technologies in Section 6. Section 7 discusses open research
problems to bridge the gap between technologies and the desired societal quality objectives, and
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 RELATING AI POLICY FRAMEWORKS TO TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES
The widespread integration of AI in services, products and systems has raised various concern in
society about issues such as ethics, employment, legal implications and human rights. To be able to
address these concerns a variety of AI policy frameworks has been proposed by governments and
organisations world-wide articulated which qualities AI-based systems should exhibit with respect
to the identified societal concerns. In this sectionwe discuss the requirements these frameworks pose
on AI-based services (Section 2.1) and argue that four technology properties (Fairness, Explainability,
Auditability, Safety/Security) should be central to the design of machine-learning systems to fulfil
these requirements (Section 2.2).
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Table 1. Trustworthy technology classes related to FAT* frameworks. ✗= no mention, ✓= mentioned,✔✔=
emphasised
Framework Year Document Owner Entities Country Fairness Explainability Safety Auditability
Top 10 principles of ethical AI 2017 UNI Global Union Ind Switzerland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Toronto Declaration 2018 Amnesty International Gov, Ind Canada ✔✔ ✓ ✗ ✓
Future of work and Education
For the Digital Age 2018 T20: Think 20 Gov Argentina ✔✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
Universal Guidelines for AI 2018 The public voice coalition Ind Belgium ✔✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
Human Rights in the Age of AI 2018 Access Now Gov, Ind United States ✔✔ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Preparing for the Future of AI 2016 US national Science,and Technology Council
Gov, Ind,
Acad United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Draft AI R&D Guidelines 2017 Japan Government Gov Japan ✗ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
White Paper on AI Standardization 2018 Standards Administrationof China Gov, Ind China ✓ ✗ ✔✔ ✔✔
Statements on AI, Robotics and
‘Autonomous’ Systems 2018
European Group
on Ethics in Science
and New Technologies
Gov, Ind,
Acad Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✔
For a Meaningful Artificial
Intelligence 2018
Mission assigned by
the French Prime Minister Gov, Ind France ✓ ✓ ✗ ✔✔
AI at the Service of Citizens 2018 Agency for Digital Italy Gov, Ind Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI for Europe 2018 European Commission Gov, Ind Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI in the UK 2018 UK House of Lords Gov, Ind United Kingdom ✔✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI in Mexico 2018 British Embassyin Mexico City Gov Mexico ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2018
German Federal Ministries
of Education, Economic
Affairs, and Labour
and Social Affairs
Gov, Ind Germany ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✔
Draft Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy AI 2018
European High Level Expert
Group on AI Gov, Ind, Civ ✔✔ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
AI Principles and Ethics 2019 Smart Dubai Ind UAE ✔✔ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Principles to Promote FEAT AI in
the Financial Sector 2019
Monetary Authority
of Singapore Gov, Ind Singapore ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Tenets 2016 Partnership on AI Gov, Ind, Acad United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Asilomar AI Principles 2017 Future of Life Institute Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
The GNI Principles 2017 Global Network Initiative Gov, Ind United States ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Montreal Declaration 2018 University of Montreal Gov, Ind, Civ Canada ✔✔ ✔✔ ✔✔ ✓
Ethically Aligned Design 2019 IEEE Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✔
Seeking Ground Rules for AI 2019 New York Times Ind, GeP United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
European Ethical Charter on
the Use of AI in Judicial Systems 2018 Council of Europe: CEPEJ Gov France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI Policy Principles 2017 ITI Gov, Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
The Ethics of Code 2017 Sage Ind United States ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Microsoft AI Principles 2018 Microsoft Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
AI at Google: Our Principles 2018 Google Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
AI Principles of Telef\’onica 2018 Telef\’onica Ind Spain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Guiding Principles on Trusted
AI Ethics 2019 Telia Company Ind Sweden ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Declaration of the Ethical
Principles for AI 2019 IA Latam Ind Chile ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
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2.1 AI Policy Frameworks
Table 1 provides a set of policy frameworks that have been proposed up to and including 2019, either
exclusively considering AI or for technologies in general, including AI. These frameworks have been
introduced by a variety of stakeholders, including technology companies, government, professional
and standardisation bodies and academic researchers. The AI elements of these policy frameworks
present varying sets of qualities that AI-based systems should exhibit to handle concerns about
discrimination, accountability, human rights, etc. By their nature, these documents discuss high–
level objectives for the concerned systems as well as the involved science and technology, but do
not go into specific technical implementation.
Recent literature provides very interesting reviews of AI policy frameworks. Whittlestone et
al. [222] provide a critical analysis of frameworks for ethical AI. They point out the inconsistency
across frameworks, for instance, frameworks may confuse the interpretation of qualities, may
present conflicting definitions and qualities may be different across different documents. Partic-
ularly relevant, also for the underlying technologies, is that the frameworks often fail to realise
dependencies between policy objectives (e.g. addressing discrimination may lead to unexpected
privacy leakages).
Fjeld et al. [66] also analyse currently available AI policy frameworks, from industry, govern-
ments, general public, civil societies and academic bodies. Table 1 includes many of the AI policy
frameworks considered by [66]. They identify 47 different objectives, which they categorise into
eight qualities. These eight qualities are: (1) privacy, (2) accountability, (3) safety & security, (4)
transparency & explainability, (5) fairness & non-discrimination, (6) human control of technology,
(7) professional responsibility and (8) promotion of human values. We will map these eight qualities
on technology properties in the next section.
2.2 FEAS: Fairness, Explainability, Auditability and Safety
To build AI-based systems that fulfil the above-mentioned qualities distilled from policy frame-
work, we argue that we should consider technologies for four properties: Fairness, Explainability,
Auditability and Safety (FEAS).
• Fairness Technologies: technologies focused on detection, prevention and mitigation of
discrimination and bias
• Explainability Technologies: technologies focused on explaining and interpreting the
outcomes and actions of AI-based systems to stakeholders (including end-users)
• Auditability Technologies: technologies focused on enabling third parties and regulators
to supervise, challenge or monitor the operation of the model(s)
• Safety Technologies: technologies focused on ensuring the operation of the AI-based
system as intended in presence of accidental failures and malicious attackers
Table 2 establishes how the eight qualities derived in [66] for policy frameworks relate to the
FEAS properties. In the table, ✔✔indicates the technology property is necessary in achieving
the quality, and, vice versa, the quality sets requirements for the technologies. ✓indicates the
technology property impacts or is impacted by the quality, but not as strong or as comprehensive.
If there is no mark, the technology property is not typically necessary and less directly dependent
on the requirements of the specific quality. We discuss each of the qualities (as defined in [66]) and
explain the relation with the technology properties depicted in Table 2.
Privacy in [66] relates to control over the use of data, the right to restrict processing, etc. Within
computing, this usually fits under security, an element of safety. Auditability usually comes with
privacy implications, usually negatively impacting on privacy. Accountability concerns elements
such as assessing impact, legal responsibility, the ability to appeal, creation of a monitoring body, etc.
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Table 2. Technology properties to establish the policy framework qualities [136]. ✓= technology property
impacts the quality,✔✔= technology property is pivotal to the quality
Technology Property
Policy Framework Quality Fairness Explainability Auditability Safety & Security
Privacy ✓ ✔✔
Accountability ✓ ✔✔
Safety & Security ✔✔
Transparency & Explainability ✔✔ ✓
Fairness & Non-Discrimination ✔✔
Human Control of Technology ✓
Professional Responsibility
Promotion of Human Values ✔✔
If a third-party is involved, this directly relates to auditability (✔✔), and some require the support
from technologies for explainability (✓). Safety & Security is self-explanatory, as are Transparency &
Explainability and Fairness & non-Discrimination, where we note that Transparency & Explainability
may require and impact technologies developed for auditability. Human Control of Technology
includes the ability to opt out and the human review of automated decisions, which primarily
relates to technologies for explainability. Professional Responsibility refers to ethical design, scientific
integrity, which, although relevant for each, does not strongly relate to any of the technology
properties specifically. Finally, Promotion of Human Values has many dimensions, but many of these
are not directly impacted by technology properties. As marked in the table, the exception is the
machine learning approaches for fairness that have emerged in recent years.
The mapping in Table 2 between qualities in policy frameworks and concrete technology classes
always allows room for debate. To test the mapping is reasonable, we went through each of the
policy framework of Table 1 to identify the technology properties that relate strongly with the
respective policy frameworks. Table 1 marks frameworks that refer to fairness, explainability,
safety and auditability technology properties, using the symbols ✓and ✔✔as explained in the
table caption. As one can see from Table 1, all four of the FEAS technology properties tend to be
mentioned in each of the policy frameworks, with an emphasis on most frequently on Safety &
Security and Fairness.
3 TRUSTWORTHY MACHINE LEARNING LIFE CYCLE
The literature presents life cycles for AI-based systems at vastly varying levels of abstractions. In
this work, we use the chain of trust for machine learning (Figure 1), which we introduced in [214].
The chain of trust is inspired on the machine learning software pipelines proposed for real-life big
data systems [183]. The pipelines combines in a single workflow software packages and tools that
perform tasks such as data collection, streaming, analysis, visualization. Examples application for
such pipelines include medical imaging [77], IoT [184] or other production systems [183].
The stages identified in pipelines typically encompass the stages identified in Figure 1, worked
out in detail for a particular domain. The precise stages that one naturally distinguishes within a
life cycle depends on the type of machine learning that is applied. AI applications in robotics are
considerably different from the big data oriented systems, systems based on reinforcement learning
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Data
Collection
Data
Preparation
Feature
Engineering
Training Testing
Inference
Data-Centric
Stages
Model-Centric
Stages
Fig. 1. Various stages in the machine learning lifecycle, motivating the notion of a chain of trust.
differ from these based on (un-)supervised learning, and a system that relies on online learning is
inherently different from those using a batched learning approach (see, e.g., [219] for a discussion).
We believe that the stages in the chain of trust are generic enough to usefully frame the discussion
of trustworthy machine learning across the variety of AI-based systems that exists.
The chain of trust in Figure 1 contains two groups of stages, the data-centric stages and the
model-centric stages. In Section 5 and 6 we discuss trustworthiness technologies for these two
groups of stages, respectively.
The data-centric stages consist of Data Collection, Data Preparation and Feature Engineering.
To establish services that fulfil the qualities proposed in the policy frameworks, it is critical to
consider elements such as bias and privacy starting from the initial Data Collection. The data will go
through other pre–processing to facilitate the application of machine learning techniques. This is
represented by the stages Data Preparation, to ‘clean up’ the data sets to be fit for the application of
machine learning approaches, and Feature Extraction, in which we include feature engineering by
experts, dimensionality reduction and feature selection. We would not include in this data-centric
stage feature learning approaches such as principal component analysis or autoencoders, since
these are machine learning techniques in their own right.
The model-centric stages we distinguish are Training, Testing and Inference. Training refers to
the building of the model based on a subset of the data, the training data. The Testing stage refers
to evaluating the model arrived at in training, based on some metric. For example, in classification,
a typical accuracy metric is the proportion of the test data that has been mapped correctly to
their original label. The Inference stage refers to the actual use of the model to make decisions or
predictions. Delineating between these three stages is natural in batched learning, in which quality
data is available to train and test offline. In online or incremental learning approaches, e.g., used if
the training data is too large to allow offline training or if the characteristics of the data change
relatively rapidly over time, the stages cannot be delineated so clearly since training, testing and
inference is intertwined [158].
The different stages in the chain of trust are not independent. For instance, bias in the results of
models are impacted by how the data was pre–processed. In Figure 1 we represent this dependency
between the stages through the chain. Moreover, systems will often iterate through (some of) the
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stages during their lifecycle, particularly in online learning settings where a model is continuously
updated. The chain of trust is therefore represented a cycle in Figure 1. We refer to [214] for a
detailed discussion of various additional characteristics of the chain of trust.
4 FEAS: DEFINITIONS, CHALLENGES AND ASSESSMENT
In this section we introduce the FEAS properties, providing definitions and discuss how to assess
each property.
4.1 Fairness
A decision rule is said to be unfair if it treats individuals with similar decision-related features
in a different way due to personal characteristics that should not affect the final decision. Recent
years have seen several examples of fairness issues in machine learning models [151], for instance
Amazon Inc. adopted a ML algorithm for its recruiting system that proved to be biased against
women [47]. As a consequence, fairness has has gained dramatically increased attention in both
academia and industry, aiming to establish variants of fairness-aware machine learning, which
Friedler et al. [72] defines as “algorithms to provide methods under which the predicted outcome of
a classifier operating on data about people is fair or non-discriminatory”. The literature is extensive,
crosses multiple disciplines, and arguable, as a new and fast moving field, still dispersed [192].
Fairness is particularly important if it concerns discrimination in relation to data features about
Protected Attributes (PAs). These usually include (but are not limited to) ethnicity, gender, age,
nationality, religion and socio-economic group. PAs are also referred to as sensitive attributes in
the literature. California Law [9] distinguishes disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate
treatment occurs if the PAs affect the process output, while disparate impact happens when the
output of the process disproportionately impacts depending on PAs.
Machine learning algorithms are typically not inherently fair or unfair; however, the outcome
of a machine learning model can be unfair due to several reasons [151]. Collected data is, by its
nature, a reflection of the real world. Thus, unfairness or discrimination in the real world would be
reflected in related datasets, which would feed into the algorithms and therefore produce unfair
outcomes. A dataset doesn’t become fair by simply ignoring the protected attributes [143], since
correlations between features could still lead to discrimination. For example, an individual’s post
code, degree, hobbies, etc., are likely to be correlated to their ethnicity. In addition, other phenomena
may contribute to bias in the date, for instance the lower frequency in data of underrepresented
groups (known as size disparity), which may cause an inferior predictive performance for these
minority groups.
Designing a fair machine learning system requires being able to measure and assess fairness.
Researchers have worked on formalising fairness for a long time. Narayanan [166] lists at least
21 different fairness definitions in the literature and this number is growing. A full list of fairness
definition can be found in [218]. For the following definitions, let the set A denote the protected
attributes of an individualU , and X the rest of attributes that can be observed by the algorithm. Let
Y be the actual label of an individual and Yˆ the predicted label stemming from the machine learning
algorithm. The different fairness definitions may be categorised as suggested by Kusner et al. [122],
as follows.
• Fairness Through Unawareness (FTU). An algorithm satisfies FTU when its predictions
are independent of the PAs [122]:
Yˆ : X → Y .
The above definition simply discards the protected attributes (A) in the decision making
process. FTU is also referred to as anti-classification [40] in the literature.
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• Individual Fairness (IF. An algorithm satisfies IF when similar samples yield similar
outcomes. Generally, given a metric d and some value δ , if d(Ui ),Uj ) < δ , the predictions for
Ui andUj should be roughly similar:
Yˆ (Xi ,Ai ) ≈ Yˆ
(
X j ,Aj
)
.
The problem with IF is that metric d needs to be adequately defined (or learnt, see [122]).
Thus, the implementation of such fairness is prone to increasing unfairness when not chosen
correctly.
Joseph et al. [108] propose a metric known as Rawlisian Fairness based on Rawl’s notion of
fair equality for opportunity. This notion emphasises that the individuals with same talents
and motivations should have the same prospects of success.
• Group Fairness. This refers to a family of definitions, all of which consider the performance
of a model on the population groups level. Most of the fairness definitions in this group
are focused on keeping positive ratios proportional across groups. The definitions in this
category are relevant to the disparate treatment and impact notions. The most popular group
fairness definitions—as presented in [64, 95]—follow, where A = 0 and A = 1 determine
membership of a protected group or not.
– Demographic Parity (DP). A classifier satisfies DP when outcomes are equal across
groups:
P
(
Yˆ = 1 | A = 0
)
= P
(
Yˆ = 1 | A = 1
)
.
– Equalised Odds (EO). A classifier satisfies EO if equality of outcomes happens across
both groups and true labels:
P
(
Yˆ = 1 | A = 0,Y = γ
)
= P
(
Yˆ = 1 | A = 1,Y = γ
)
,
where γ ∈ {0, 1}.
– Equality of Opportunity. is similar to EO, but only requires equal outcomes across
subgroups for true positives:
P
(
Yˆ = 1 | A = 0,Y = 1
)
= P
(
Yˆ = 1 | A = 1,Y = 1
)
.
We note that [95] relates these metrics to disparate treatment and impact discussed above.
Other metrics of fairness related to disparate treatment may be found in [39, 41].
• Counterfactual Fairness (CF). The use of causal models can be a very powerful fairness
analysis tool [122, 123]. Given a causal model, CF compares the probabilities of the possible
outcomes for different interventions—substituting the structural equations of a PA with a
fixed value. Formally, a predictor Yˆ satisfies CF if under any context X = x and PA value
A = a,
P
(
YˆA←a = y | X = x ,A = a
)
= P
(
YˆA←a′ = y | X = x ,A = a
)
for all y and for any value a′ attainable by A.
The above definitions of fairness are statistical definitions that can be directly applied to machine
learning. Grgic-Hlaca et al. [86] argue that is not always possible or desirable. They propose a
procedure to ensure a fair use of attributes through users’ feedback and call this Process Fairness
(PF) . An algorithm satisfies PF if the use of attributes is considered fair in the model assessed
through some other means.
It is important to note that establishing fairness with respect to one definition does not necessarily
imply into fair output in another notion. in fact, it is theoretically not possible to fulfil all of the
definitions at the same time for a model, as shown by Friedler et al. [70]. Similarly, fairness definition
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are not necessarily easy to apply correctly, as demonstrated by Kusner et al. [122] who show that
some specific definitions of fairness can increase discrimination if applied incorrectly, while [70]
show that slight changes in the training set has noticeable impact on the discrimination performance
in the output, thus leading to result instability. Clearly, designing discrimination-free models is not
straightforward, something we will elaborate on when discussing open problems.
4.2 Explainability
In the machine learning literature, the terms explainability, transparency, intelligibility, comprehen-
sibility and interpretability are often used interchangeably [90]. Lipton [137] provides a detailed
discussion on terminology. The challenge in explainability is to bridge the gap between the op-
erations of the algorithms and human understanding of how the outcomes has been obtained.
According to Guidotti et al. [90], explanation is an interface between the decision maker and
humans. An explanation should strive to be accurate, as it portrays the inner functionality of the
machine learning model, as well as comprehensible, as it intends to convey the decision process to
humans. Herman [98] sees this as a trade-off, between explaining a model’s decision faithfully and
presenting it a human understandable way. Guidotti et al. [90] suggest an explainable model must
have at least two qualities in addition to accuracy, namely interpretability, or the extent to which a
consumer of the explanation finds it understandable, and fidelity. The latter refers to the extent
that an explainable model operates similar to a black–box model. Ideally, the explainable model
must give the same results as the black–box model.
Doshi-Velez et al. [53] introduce two types of explainability, namely explainability with reference
to a specific application, for instance a physician being able to understand the reasoning behind a
classifier’s medical diagnostic, and domain-independent explainability, where it is possible to un-
derstand how the classifier has produced one particular prediction. They describe three dimensions
for such system: level of the explanation, i.e., global vs local time limitations, and user expertise.
Time limitations refer to the amount of time that the user needs to understand the explanation. In
emergencies, such as surgical procedures and disasters, the users require a simple, straightforward
explanation so they would spend minimum amount of time to understand the decision process.
However, in less time–constrained situations, the users might prefer detailed explanations over
simplistic ones. Also, the method of explanations is dependent on the user’s level of expertise. For
instance, a data scientist is more interested to know more about the inner patterns and parameters
of the model and the data whereas an executive manager requires a bird-eye explanation of how a
specific decision is determined [38].
Technical approaches to providing explanations from predictive machine learning models can be
model-specific or model-agnostic. Examples of model-specific explanations are discussed e.g. in [69].
These include not only linear regression and logistic models, which are arguably the simplest “native
explainable” models, but also decision trees, classifiers such as SVM (Support Vector Machines),
and Bayesian probabilistic classifiers. Model-specific explanations do not capture the complexity of
highly non-linear models, including Neural Networks and Deep Networks in particular.
Model-agnostic explanation approaches address this category of models in a post hoc fashion,
namely by accepting that the model is a black box, and attempting to approximate its behaviour by
repeatedly requesting predictions in specific areas of the feature space [220]. A notable example
of this approach is Lime [187], which seeks to provide local explanations in the form of linear
approximations of the model that are accurate in small regions of the space. This is useful, for
example, to explain why a certain individual has been denied a mortgage application. Other post-hoc
model-agnostic approaches provide explanations in the form of a ranking of features, even when the
underlying model is not-linear. These include, amongst others, InterpretML [129, 173] and Shapley
Values [144]. The main characteristic of both these approaches is to provide not only a ranking of
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features in order of importance, but at a more granular level, an indication of the importance of
the feature as a function of its value. For instance, an explanation may indicate that age becomes
a more a dominant feature to predict a negative outcome for some disease as it increases, but it
may be irrelevant for, say, young patients. Finally, Van der Schaar et al. [3] propose a breakthrough
approach to model-agnostic explainability based on the notion that arbitrarily non-linear models
can be approximated using a set of equations, from which explanations can be more easily derived.
There is consensus over the lack of evaluation framework to assess explainability of a model [53,
137, 155, 200]. Kononenko et al. [116] suggest a qualitative approach to measure explainability.
Letham et al. [133] propose an evaluation framework that were limited in terms of scalability or
needed prior expertise before using them. Other proposals [144, 197] propose frameworks that
involve an explainability dimension along with other parameters. They mainly focus on the effects
explainability has on computational efficiency on the model. Finally, Schmidt etal. [200] propose an
inclusive quantitative framework to measure explainability in various machine learning algorithms.
Their proposed framework measures the effectiveness of the explanation for algorithmic decisions
by focusing on the information transfer rate at which humans make the same decisions. They
also defined a trust metric which determines how humans are willing to accept the algorithmic
explanations.
4.3 Auditability
Auditability refers to the methods that enable third parties to verify the operations and outcome of
a model. The motivation for auditing very often stems from the other three properties, fairness,
explainability and safety & security. For instance, since model fairness is affected by bias in the
training set as discussed in Sec. 6.1, one may want to establish an auditable trail to decide whether
the bias was native to the raw data, and whether it was affected by any of the operations performed
during data pre-processing.
Auditibility of the model generation process and the model operation is important for the imple-
mentation of regulations such as the European GDPR legislation. At its core, GDPR is about data
protection, posing requirements on industry, government and other data owners about safeguarding
the date, transparency of the data collection process and explicit consent from an individual for the
use of its data. This implies that under GDPR people have the right to challenge the data collection,
have control over their collected data and maintains the “right to be forgotten” from the data source.
[182] notes a trade-off between keeping data private and the ability of machine-learning systems to
perform certain tasks. This trade-off is a key concern behind policy shaping for AI-based systems.
Particularly interesting is that GDPR also requires “suitable explanations” to be provided for any
decision made by an algorithm [85]. Providing mechanisms to audit a model, as well as the process
used to obtain a model, ensure that the model itself is accountable for the decisions it produces.
The case for accountability in algorithmic decision making has also emerged outside GDPR, most
notably in [50] and in other countries such as India [28] and China [195] legislation is under review.
In turn the need for accountability entails validating the fairness of a model.
4.4 Safety & Security
The category of safety and security properties refers to the robust operation of systems in real-life
operation. This covers a wide variety of concerns, from safe vehicles to protection of data against
privacy attacks. In this paper we emphasise the review of literature with respect to security and
privacy. For a discussion of terminology and a broad perspective on the design of dependable
systems, see [8].
Security of AI-based systems and services refers to the protection of these systems against
malicious attacks. Traditionally, the objective in securing a system is expressed through the CIA
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triad: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [208]. Confidentiality attacks are designed to expose
the structure, configuration of a model or privacy leakage to access the data. Privacy equates
to maintaining confidentiality. Attacks to the integrity attempt to alter the output of model to
the adversary’s choice or change the behaviour of the model to the attacker’s intention. Finally,
availability attacks aim to prevent the model’s usual service to the client or getting meaningful
results.
A perfectly secure system does not exist [5, p. 21] and this holds also for AI-based systems [10].
The security of amachine learning system (see Section 6.4) are impacted by the chosen cryptographic
primitives, hardware vulnerabilities, protocol inefficiencies in design and implementation as well
as the behaviours of humans implementing, deploying and using it. Clearly, the current large-
scale adoption of machine learning motivates attackers to actively engage into detecting design
weaknesses or implementation bugs and leveraging them to collect information [209], modify
data [14, 20, 22, 238], contaminate the operation of the algorithm [10, 115, 203, 209], exploit leakage
of sensitive information [55, 61, 102, 119, 142] and much more [32, 120, 139, 161, 168, 172, 177, 203].
Understanding the attacker is the building block of any defensive mechanisms [5, p. 20]. Attacks
on machine learning systems exhibit intention and capability [169] or, similarly, goal, knowledge,
capability and attacking strategy, see Baggio et al. [19]. In [19], the goal of the attack describes the
desired impact of the attack in accordance with the CIA model. The goal’s impact can be of two
types: targeted attacks, which aim to damage a specific victim, or indiscriminate attacks, which
aim for extensive damage with no exception. Knowledge determines the degree of intelligence
that the attacker has at the time of the execution of the attack. A black-box adversary designs
the attack without any knowledge of the model‘s internal configurations, whereas a white-box
adversary knows the settings in which the model is trained and operates. In the real-world, the
black-box attacks is reportedly more common [178]. Capability determines the degree to which
the attacker is able to successfully implement an attack scenario and get access to the data or
the model. Capability can be a qualitative feature with regards to three aspects [138]: whether
the security threat is causative (i.e. direct manipulation of the model or data) or exploratory (i.e.
injection of manipulated data to mislead the model), the percentage of the training or test data that
is controlled by the attacker and to which extent the attacker knows the model configurations and
its features. Capabilities increase significantly if one considers insiders, that is, individuals that
know about one or more of the pipeline stages. To avoid weakening the overall system [178] argues
that there should be different levels of access to different actors involved in the model pipeline,
i.e. data-owners, system providers, consumers and outsiders. The attacking strategy deals with the
analysis of the behaviour of the attacker at the time of the exploit. There are usually different ways
to implement an attack with a certain goal. Strategy refers to selection of the optimal function that
characterises the goal.
Security assessment of a system is usually based on a “what-if” analysis [138]. The appropriate
defensive mechanism is implemented based on the conditions of the data, model and the environ-
ment that the system is going to be deployed. The designers should provide an assessment of the
vulnerabilities of the model, too [17].
When designing a machine learning system for security, one needs to combine a reactive design
approach with a proactive approach [138]. In reactive design, the designer implements defensive
mechanisms after a vulnerability is detected. However, the current pace of progress in machine
learning and applications justifies one to consider security and privacy from the initial stages
of designing a model until the model operates in the wild. Thus, the trend is to take a proactive
attitude and anticipate common threats through a set of what–if queries [191]. For instance, in a
proactive design approach, the model designer may invite a red team to attack the system before
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deployment. In either approach one needs to realistic analysis of the potential attackers for the
goal, knowledge, capability and strategy dimensions of attackers identified by [19].
Both approaches take an empirical way to tackle security. Thus, they rely on a predefined set
of known attack scenarios. As a result, they lack comprehensive vision for a safe system because
they do not take into account creative and novel attacks in their threat model. The more vital
applications of machine learning require stricter approach in the design by modelling the behaviour
of the system mathematically [74, 124, 125, 135, 202, 225].
5 DATA-CENTRIC TRUSTWORTHINESS TECHNOLOGIES
In this section, we review trustworthiness solutions in the data–centric stages in machine learning
pipeline (see Figure 1), that is, data collection, pre–processing and feature selection, respectively.
The subsequent sections review each of FEAS properties.
5.1 Fairness in the Data-Centric Stages
Data inevitably reflects the nature of the environment that it has been obtained from as well as the
decisions made in that environment. Pedreshi et al. [180] aptly state that “learning from historical
data may lean to discover the traditional prejudices that are endemic in reality”.
An important class of bias in ML is sample bias [45]. This refers to sampling in such a way that
not all PA groups are adequately represented, i.e. to the dataset being imbalanced [132]. This kind
of bias is not to be confused with statistical bias, which refers to a systematic error in the expected
result of a process, differing significantly from the true value of the quantity being estimated [51].
The notion of sample bias is in direct relation with group fairness definitions as explained in
section 4.1 since they both concern with maintaining a balanced ratio of data vs. output in the
machine learning system. There are two possible sampling bias directions for PA groups, namely
to be over or under represented [45]. Naturally, one PA group being overrepresented means that
some of the remaining groups will be underrepresented. This poses the risk of a learning algorithm
being giving up on accuracy for the minoritary groups for improved overall accuracy [9, 111, 132].
An extreme case of underrepresentation would be the existence of a group being unknown to the
algorithm.
A first step to reduce bias is to ensure the data has been collected in an adequate manner [4].
This implies that the collection process should yield representative data from all PA groups. This
is not always easy to achieve, since full understanding of the environment and full control over
the data-collection processes are needed. In order to prevent sampling bias, a possible approach is
stratified sampling methods [171].
A potential strategy to avoid bias is to learn about the unintended discrimination that may occur
in the specific problem one is resolving. Such awareness is vital but not sufficient to prevent dis-
crimination [45]. The active learning approach involves expert human supervision in the collection
to improve the process [201]. Alessandro et al. [45] suggest that data scientists should also test and
document all the features that have high correlation with the minority groups. Also, data scientists
should perform a statistical demographic analysis to gain knowledge about groups that are prone
to discrimination.
A different approach consists of pre-processing the data, with the aim of feeding an unbiased
training set into the model [60, 127]. These pre-processing methods can be based on either class
labels or on attributes. In the class labels approach, data is relabelled to reduce disparity; this is
sometimes referred to as massaging the dataset. These correction methods may be generic [109], or
adjusted with respect to a particular combination of world-views [71] and fairness definitions [233].
Alternatively, Luong et al. [145] assign a decision value to each data sample and then adjusts this
value to eliminate discrimination.
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In the attributes approach to pre-processing, one either maps the attributes into a transformed
space [31] or combines the values of the protected attributes with the non-protected [64]. Feld-
man et al. [64] propose to modify each attribute so that marginal distribution of the PA and non-PA
values remain equal all over the dataset.
Pre-processing techniques have no awareness about the internal operation of a machine learning
model and as a result they are not tuned for the the optimal functioning of the model, resulting
in a trade-off between fairness and accuracy [241]. This, however, makes most of them model-
agnostic and highly interpretable. Relabelling of the training data, though, potentially affects the
explainability of the model [231] and has a steeper fairness-accuracy trade-off [233].
5.2 Explainability in the Data-Centric Stages
Data has different degrees of explainability to humans [90]. The vast majority of machine learning
algorithms use data representation in vector and metrics forms [90]. Johansson et al. [103] suggest
that tables are the most understandable data format for humans and algorithms. Tables are a familiar
format of data representation for humans, while the process of converting them to vectors and
metrics is straightforward. Images and texts are also understandable to humans but conversion to
matrices and vectors and back is not straightforward, thus making it more challenging to explain the
steps of the algorithm [90].. Explainable algorithms that can process images and texts would require
a transformation processes such as equivalences, approximations or heuristics for explaining the
decision making process.
Explainability in other types of data such as sequence data, spatio–temporal data and complex
network data, has not yet been researched. A potentially effective explainability tool is to visualise
the data (and the steps of the algorithms). Visualization could assist in identifying correlations and
connections between seemingly unrelated variables. In practice, however, the high dimension of the
data does not allow comprehensive visualisation. One solution is transforming high-dimensional
data into a two or three-dimensional space, e.g., [146].
Zelaya [82] highlights the impact of the appropriate data–processingmethodology before training
of the model in the overall explainability of the machine learning system. This includes the data-
centric stages of data collection, pre-processing and feature selection. Zelaya [82] defines a metric
which compares the outputs of classifiers trained over two training sets, an unprocessed and a
pre–processed one. This comparison allows one to analyse the impact of pre-processing on the
explainability of the model. Blum et al. [23] present a survey on data selection methods for large
datasets containing redundant and irrelevant data samples. They focus on two key issues in dataset,
first, selection of features and second, selection of most useful samples from the dataset. Crone
et al. [44] study the effects of pre–processing methods such as scaling, sampling and encoding
variables over prediction performances. Similar analyses have been performed for text data such as
documents [81], text classification [216] and sentiment analysis [56]. Other directions such as [29],
followed the same approach.
In our opinion, explainability in the data collection, pre-processign and feature engineering
stages of the machine learning life cycle has been underexposed compared to work on algorithsm.
Arguable, even for explainable algorithms there is a clear need to explain the sources of data and
how it was processed. Labelling standards in supervised machine learning are only a small step
and the area deserves much more attention.
5.3 Auditability in the Data-Centric Stages
Auditing of the operations of a real-life machine learning system inherently requires one the
monitor across all the stages of the chain of trust, from data collection all the way to inference.
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technology solutions therefore also tend to span all stages. This is particularly true for provenance
solutions that target machine-learning systems [91].
We therefore refer to Section 6.3 for an extensive discussion of provenance technique for machine
learning systems.
5.4 Safety & Security in the Data-Centric Stages
There exist a plethora of techniques for safe and secure information systems. In this section, we
first discuss how these general concerns apply to systems and services that are based on machine-
learning, with a particular emphasis on big data. Then we discuss interesting recent developments
in privacy through differential privacy and data-related attacks on machine learning associated
with data poisoning.
One of the main differentiators of many modern-day machine-learning systems is the large
volume of data that requires to be stored or streamed. The sensitivity of the analysis implies that
there is an emphasis to store the data securely to preserve privacy and security against various
types of attacks is imminent. Perdosci et al. [181] managed to implement a real–world attack in
Polygraph [170] (a worm signature generation tool) by systematically injecting noise into the flow
detection dataset and consequently reduce the accuracy of model intentionally.
Lafuente [126] suggests several security strategies for storing big data, both structured and
unstructured. First, the data should be anonymised, meaning personal identifiable information is
removed from the dataset. Note that this alone may not be sufficient for privacy protection since
the anonymised data can be cross–referenced with other sources of the data to leak information, a
process is known as de–anonymisation or linking attacks in the literature [167]. Second, the data
must be encrypted. This is particularly the case when it comes to cloud–based machine learning
services (i.e. Machine Learning as a Service [99, 186]), both for storage and data transmission. Since
the data requires processing, and thus decryption, encryption needs to be complemented by strong
security guarantees of the (virtualized) servers. To make sure the data is only decrypted by the party
that owns the data, one would utilize reliable key distribution or concepts such as attribute–based
encryption [12] which enables a fine–grained access control on the encrypted data. Third, access
control and monitoring is essential to protect the data. Usually, a combination of cryptography
and access control forms an appropriate approach [126]. However, even popular systems such as
Hadoop lack a proper authentication solution [105]. Real–time monitoring is typically accompanied
by threat intelligence systems and up–to–date vulnerability detection. The fourth strategy around
governance, including implementing regulatory frameworks such as GDPR (see also auditability).
An important recent concept with respect to privacy is to store data using cryptographic prim-
itives that provide Differential Privacy [57]. In differential privacy, the calculation of the result
by a machine learning algorithm is not sensitive to change in an individual data item. In other
words, the output of a machine learning system does not reveal information about an individual.
Differential privacy models have two main benefits in comparison with the conventional privacy
preserving mechanisms. First, it protects against attackers with full knowledge of the data records
except for the target record, i.e., the strongest possible attacker in practice. Second, differential
privacy properties of functions are mathematically proven. Differential privacy is considered one
of the main trends in the privacy-preserving machine learning literature [1, 62, 121, 193, 221].
To assure integrity of the data, pre–processing techniques benefit from tampering–prevention
measurements [178]. The integrity attacks in this category work based on polluting or poisoning
the datasets. Poisoning attacks on the training data aim to alter the model that is derived during the
training stage. Poisoning attacks on the testing set attempt to manipulate the test data distribution
in order to separate it from the training set. This would eventually increase the likelihood of false
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recognition in presence of polluted data when the machine learning model is operating in the
inference stage [63, 153, 227].
Security architects of a machine learning systems evaluate the degree of malicious modifications
of data with probability β in their security assumptions. Kearns et al. [113] determine an upper
bound for β . In their analysis, a machine learning algorithm with an error rate of ϵ , requires
attackers to modify a fraction less than ϵ1+ϵ of the training set. The attacker with access merely
to labels of the training data is constraint to a limited attack surface, requiring one to determine
the most useful labels to manipulate [178]. In this case, the attacker can operate by perturbing the
labels randomly or heuristically. Baggio et al. [20] demonstrate that to impact the efficiency of SVM
classifier, random manipulation of 40 % of labels in a training set is required. In contrast, it requires
10 % of the labels to be manipulated if it is done purposely.
A number of further advances have been made with respect to data poisoning attacks. If attackers
gain access to all the features in addition to the labels in training set, then they would be capable
of implementing more serious attack scenarios [152, 226]. They would benefit them the most if
training stage is performed online [237] (i.e. the training dataset is updated regularly as the data is
being collected). In online setting, Kloft et al. [115] poison the training set of a clustering system for
anomaly detection and the same approach has been applied to malware clustering techniques [22].
In offline learning, Biggio et al. [21] propose an attack that detect the target sample in the training
set and degrades classification accuracy accordingly, assuming the classifier is a SVM. Xiao et
al.Z[226] propose the same strategy to degrade the functionality of feature selection algorithms
like LASSO.
The countermeasures to malicious poisoning attack rely on monitoring the distribution charac-
teristics of training and testing datasets. The existence of adversarial samples in a data set deforms
the distribution; thus, some researchers propose anomaly detection techniques based on data distri-
butions in adversarial environments [17, 19, 68, 150]. Grosse et al. [87] introduce two statistical
metrics, Maximum Mean Discrepancy and Energy Distance, to measure the statistical properties
of sample distributions especially on test samples. Their proposal successfully detects malicious
injected samples in several data sets.
Mitigation techniques for data integrity focus on ensuring the purity of training and testing
data sets [138]. Data sanitization is a dominant technique in this area, e.g., [169] propose Reject
on Negative Impact to protect spam filters against malicious poisonings. The basic idea of this
method is to eliminate samples with large negative impact in the training set. They also propose
an error estimation method in online training mode to compare the error rates of the original
classifier and the one after the update. Laishram et al. [128] propose a solution protect SVM classifier
from poisoning attacks. Finally, some proposals focus on feature reduction algorithms to prevent
poisoning attacks. Rubinstein et al. [194] proposed an PCA–based poisoning detector based on
techniques from robust statistics. Their method substantially reduces poisoning in various intrusion
detection scenarios.
6 MODEL-CENTRIC TRUSTWORTHINESS TECHNOLOGIES
In this section we discuss technologies for the model-centric stages in the machine learning chain
of trust, that is Training, Test and Inference stages. The following sections survey of technologies
with respect to each if the four FEAS properties.
6.1 Fairness in the Model-Centric Stages
The research in fairness for machine learning models is developing very fast. In this section we
aim to present a high-level perspective on types of approaches presented in the literature, with
examples. To that end, we follow [92] and distinguish two types of model-centric solutions for
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fairness: in-processing solutions aim to design an algorithm that is inherently fair [72, 147], while
post-processing solutions adjust the outcomes so the outcomes are fair [93]. Within in-processing
approaches, one can distinguish between those modifying the model to remove unfairness and
those in which an independent agent carries out the detection (or prevention) of unfairness.
Using the in-processing approach various solutions introduce a fairness-regulating term in
the algorithm. For instance, Kamishima et al. [111] propose a regularization term for a logistic
regression classifier: this term penalizes existing correlations between the protected attributes (PAs)
and the predicted labels, leading to fairer classification. Kamiran et al. [110] propose a fair decision-
tree algorithm, which defines a criterion to either split or label a leaf node in order to remove
discrimination. Other approaches add a set of constraints to the model and then optimise them
simultaneously while the model is training. For instance, Goh et al. [80] use a non-convex constraint
to optimise a classifier under a fairness constraint based on disparate impact. Quadrianto et al. [185]
propose a fairness-definition agnostic unified framework. They tune two ML algorithms (privileged
learning and distribution matching) to enforce different notions of fairness. Woodworth et al. [224]
present a statistical method used in the learning process and propose a non-discrimination definition
that increases the fairness of the learning algorithm. Zafar et al. [232] introduce flexible fair
classification and suggest a novel fair boundary decision threshold. They apply their approach to
logistic regression and support vector machines. And, as a last example of introducing fairness
regulation in the algorithms, Calders et al.[30] train Naive Bayes models for every possible PA
value and then adjust the model to balance the outcomes.
A second important in-processing approach is the use of adversarial learning approaches. In
adversarial learning, two models are simultaneously trained: the first one modelling the data
distribution and the second one estimating the probability of a sample coming from the training
data rather than from the model, the objective being to maximise the probability of the first model
causing the second one to make a mistake [83]. Examples of adversarial learning for fairness are
Beutel et al. [13]—who aim at enforcing equality of opportunity—and Zhang et al [235]; this second
method is applicable to multiple fairness definitions and gradient-based learning models.
Post-processing approaches analyze the outcomes of a model and then adjust them to remove
unfairness. An important limitation of these solutions is that they require access to PAs at the
moment of decision making. Post-processing techniques can therefore not be used when there
is no access to the PAs. There are various examples of post-processing approaches. For instance,
Hardt et al.[95] design a post-processing approach which adjusts a learned predictor in order to
remove discrimination with respect to the equalised odds rate in the results. Corbett-Davis et al. [41]
work with three notions of fairness: demographic parity, conditional demographic parity—in
which proportions across PA groups should remain constant given a limited set of legitimate risk
factors, i. e. attributes naturally related to the classification task of interest—and predictive equality,
which is satisfied when there are equal false positive rates across PA groups. They then introduce
an algorithm to assign a discrimination score to a classifier, which in turn allows for detecting
unfairness.
In addition to the above specifically model-centric approaches, one can combine data-centric
and model-centric solutions. Zemel et al. [234] propose an algorithm optimising individual and
group fairness at the same time through an adequate representation of the data, obfuscating
membership to PA groups. They argue that there is a close connection between individual fairness
and the differential privacy technique of hiding attributes of data through the addition of noise
without it losing its utility [59]. Finally, Dwork et al. [58] propose a combined in-processing and
post-processing method based on training different classifiers for different PA groups.
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6.2 Explainability in the Model-Centric Stages
Explainability of machine learning models has also experienced a surge in research, and as for
fairness, our aim in this paper is to provide a high-level overview of the main types of explainability
techniques, including examples. Therefore, we adopt the classification of Guidotti et al. [90], who
distinguishes the following types model explainability approaches: explaining the outcome of the
model, known as outcome explanation and explaining the inner operation of the model, known
as model explanation. In addition, within model explanation, we distinguish explanation through
transparent models in which the model is designed for explainability, effectively interpreting its own
inner complexities, as well as techniques for representation of the model based on documentation,
visualization or provenance information.
Outcome explanation does not consider the inner functionality of models and is therefore also
referred to as black box interpretability models [200]. These solutions provide an interpretable
model that explains prediction of the black box in human–understandable terms [90]. Outcome
explainers are further classified into local and global explainers [189], where local explainers are
designed to explain the outcome of a specific model and global explainers (also called agnostic
explanator [188]) aim to be independent of the machine learning model type or the data [90].
A number of approaches to global explainers have been proposed in the literature. For instance,
Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) [189] matches the outcome of any clas-
sifier using the local approximation of the model’s outcome with an explanation model. In their
proposal, the authors define a desired explanation model and provide the outcome explanation
in their desired criteria. Black Box Explanations through Transparent Approximations (BETA) [129]
proposes to explain the outcome of any classifier using a framework to quantify the unambiguity,
fidelity and interpretability. It generates explanations in the form of decision sets (i.e. nested if-else
statements which divide data into exclusive regions) and then optimizes with respect to a combina-
tion of the mentioned quantities. In this manner, BETA ensures the generated explanation is both
understandable and comprehensive.
Local explainers are designed for a specific machine learning models or class of machine learning
models. Given the popularity of neural networks, it is not surprising that many local explainable
solutions focus on neural networks. For instance,Deep Learning Important FeaTures (DeepLIFT) [205]
explains neural networks by assigning importance to every feature through back propagation.
Building on developments such as [205], SHapley Additive Explanations (SHAP) [144]) proposes a
unified framework for local explainers which generalises six existing methods, including DeepLIFT.
We point to Montavon et al. [159] for a more detailed tutorial on explainable neural network.
Local explainers have also been developed for other machine learning models that neural net-
works. An approach for clustering algorithms is to represent each cluster with a prototypical
example [114], which provides insights into the process that formed each cluster. Other local ex-
plainers have been developed for ensemble decision trees [37, 49, 52, 76, 94, 199, 210, 213, 239] and
SVN models [73, 149, 174]. Model explanation aims to explain the internal operation of the model
instead of outcomes. From a question about why the model yields specifics outcomes, the question
becomes: why does the model behaves the way it does?. Obviously, the answer to this question
must be expressed in a human–understandable manner. The model explanation approaches can be
divided into those that use an explainer that mimics the behaviour of the model and the ones that
aim to develop a model that can explain itself (transparent models). In model explanation usually
the model behaviour is generated either as a decision tree or a series of rule–based conditions tailored
for a specific type of machine learning model [90]. In addition, there exist solutions that follow an
agnostic approach through which any type of model gets to be explained [35, 97, 118, 140, 141].
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In the decision tree methods, a decision tree defines the conditions according to which the model
decides. Such an approach allows one to represent an approximation of the black–box behaviour in
a form which is understandable to humans. Craven et al. [42] propose a comprehensive explanation
of the neural network by constructing a decision tree using a special set of queries that they called
as Trepan, and a similar approach has been applied in [211]. For neural networks, Krishnan et
al. [117] and Johansson et al. [107] use genetic programming to determine the decision tree and
also for explanation of tree ensembles (such as random forests) methods have been proposed to
explain using decision trees [24, 37, 52, 76, 199].
Rule–based approaches aim to explain the model through a set of rules derived from the be-
haviour if the model. This has for instance been done for neural networks in Cravenan et al [43].
They propose a solution to map rule extraction (a search problem) into a learning problem [90].
Other solutions in this category are [7, 106, 240], including proposals explaining Support Vector
Machines [73, 149] and tree ensembles [49].
The transparent model approach aims to make a specific model inherently explainable. As a
general approach, one aims to express the impact of coefficients and features on the explainability
of the model [190]. Also, “Generalised additive models with interactions” (GA2M), proposed by Lou
et al. [141], is one of the more well–known transparent models. Impact can be expressed through
different models, including single decision, decision trees and decision lists ([190]), in which the data
is split in a threshold–based mechanism. Transparent models have been researched for different
machine learning techniques, including linear models [96] and neural networks [159, 196, 197]. In
general, transparent models tend to be less accurate than their non-transparent counterparts, so
considerable research is still needed in establishing methods that retain the accuracy levels while
achieving explainability [90].
Well thought-through representation of the data, the model, the outcomes and the accuracy
is another way to improve explainability. Yang et al. [229] introduce “nutritional labels”, which
are a collection of metrics on fairness, stability and explainability of individual ranking based
systems such as credit scoring. They implement a web application that demonstrates these metrics
as visual widgets. Mitchel et al. [157] suggest another documentation solution named “model cards”.
These cards are short documents accompanying trained machine learning models that include
benchmarks across different populations, together with the kind of model, its target objective and
intended use, as well as the applications that the model should not be used for. It also includes a
list of the features that affect the model’s outcomes, as well as a list of ethical considerations and
usage recommendations. They propose model cards for visual and natural language processing. A
related approach is to visualise the decision making process using provenance graphs, a causality
graph that is a directed cyclic graph, enriched with annotations capturing information pertaining
to pipeline execution. In [163], the provenance graph of a model includes an annotated workflow
of the methods of data collection, pre–processing techniques, the training process of the model
and finally the parameters used for the model. This results in a complete picture of the machine
learning pipeline.
6.3 Auditability in the Model-Centric Stages
We introduced model auditability earlier, in Sec. 4.3, where we briefly introduced techniques to
achieve accountability in models. Here we briefly review three kinds of approaches to ensure that
the process used to create a model is auditable.
Firstly, one may try to formally prove that a prediction is correct. This is the approach taken
for instance by SafetyNets, a framework that enables an untrusted server (the cloud) to provide a
client with a short mathematical proof of the correctness of inference tasks performed by a deep
neural network [75], with negligible impact on the accuracy and efficiency of the model.
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A second and emerging strand of research is centred on data provenance. This is “information
about entities, activities, and people involved in producing a piece of data or thing, which can be
used to form assessments about its quality, reliability or trustworthiness.”[164]. Here the idea is that
provenance may be able to provide a useful account of all data transformations, e.g. across a complex
pipeline and further into the learning algorithm. Singh et al. [206] suggest a legal perspective on
decision provenance, which entails “using provenance methods to provide information exposing
decision pipelines”.
On more technical grounds, contributions concerning provenance focus on multiple aspects.
Firstly, one key concern is the reproducibility of the model-generation pipeline. For this, systems
have been proposed that attempt to automatically capture some of the metadata pertaining to a
model, such as the settings of the deep neural network [198]. Pipelines are typically implemented
using bespoke scripts. The VAMSA tool aims to “reverse engineer” the script and identify key data
processing operations using a knowledge base of python ML APIs [165].
As a new trend is emerging of automating the pipelines and thus script generation, eg the
“Automated Machine Learning” or AutoML movement, extracting provenance may become simpler
and more precise. Systems in use by commercial providers, such as Databricks’ FlowML, are able to
capture elements of model generation, to the extent necessary to make them reproducible.
In the context of Big Data processing, a number of proposals exist to capture fine-grained
provenance during data transformation. These include Titian [104], which however is primarily
designed to enable debugging of Big Data processing pipelines, with focus on the Spark distributed
data processing engine. A recent “roadmap” for the role of provenance in Spark-based scientific
workflows is available from Guedes et al [89]. Still in the context of map-reduce based systems, [91]
presents state of the art and research directions for provenance in the context of “Hadoop as a
Service”.
Finally, it must be noted that the detailed provenance of a process may expose sensitive elements
of the data and its transformations. Privacy preservation for provenance is a well-studied topic
but few proposals exist that are sufficiently recent or that have come to fruition. Cheney et al. [36]
provide a quick survey on provenance sanitisation. Amongst the prototype tools to create views
over provenance data (which is represented as a graph), ProvAbs [156] stands out as it is based on
the W3 standard PROV data model for describing provenance.
6.4 Safety & Security in the Model-Centric Stages
Whereas for the data-centric stages we discussed issues in data confidentiality and integrity that are
relatively well-understood, in the model-centric stages we come across issues that are traditionally
less deeply explored in computing. We will look at approaches that are directly related to the
models and algorithms of a system. Also, adversarial machine learning attacks and defences are
discussed in data–centric stages (see Section 5.4; therefore, we will not discuss them in this section.
The technologies mostly relate to the vulnerability as well as the protection in real-life operation,
that is, in the Inference stage of the chain of trust in Figure 1. For example, an attacker may target
an intrusion detection system that is actively examining a network to detect malicious activities,
this means the system is at the inference stage. Such intrusion detection system relies on a set
of rules that are fixed and tested based previously in training and testing stages. The attacker is
motivated to explore the possibility of finding a network pattern that would bypass the intrusion
detection system’s set of rules (the attack that is known as evasion attacks [138] in the literature). If
the attacker has full knowledge of the intrusion detection system, then the attempts to discover the
intrusive network pattern is done under the white–box approach. In contrast, the attacker with no
knowledge of the model is determined to rely on black–box approach. Considering ML model h
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trained with parameters θ , hθ ), white–box attacker would know part or all of either h and θ and
black–box attacker does not have any prior knowledge about the model or its parameters.
The most common threat in the model-centric stages are spoofing attacks and inversion attacks.
Spoofing attacks refer to inserting made-up data to change the outcomes of the model in a manner
advantageous to the attacker. Compared to the data poisoning attack, the attack we consider
under spoofing change the data in a semantically meaningful way, namely to purposely change
the outcome. Spoofing attacks come in two incarnations, evasion and impersonation. In case of
evasion, the attacker generates an adversarial set of samples to evade detection by the model. These
attacks mainly compromise information–security focused applications such as malware [207]
and spam [223] detection systems. The real–world implementation of these attacks has received
considerable attention in the literature [16, 134, 203, 236]. Impersonation attacks spoof the data with
the aim to pretend that the data input is from a genuine source. In a typical impersonation scenario,
attackers covertly pretend to be the victim. Then, they inject malicious samples to the model as if it
is generated by the victim; resulting into different classification outcome than the original data [34,
131, 176]. This way, the attackers can gain the same access in the system as the victim‘s [138].
These attacks has been implemented in image recognition [154], malware detection [148, 228] and
intrusion detection system [112]. Furthermore, they have been proved to be effective in deep neural
networks (DNN) since they tend to compact the features and thus, the attacker can potentially
more easily modify key features to obtain their purpose [14, 160, 162, 172, 203].
In inversion attacks the attacker first gather information about the model operation, e.g., through
its application program interface, and then use the insights gained to attack the model [204, 225].
Inversion attacks can be implemented in white–box or black–box settings, depending on the level
of information that the attacker is able collect [67]. Such attacks become even more powerful if
they utilize data leakage vulnearbilities [67, 68, 215] or misclassification erros [68]. In an interesting
demonstration of this attack, Tramèr et al. [215] specifically targeted cloud based machine learning
services to design attacks using the confidence values output by the cloud–based models in Amazon
and Google.
Countermeasures against such threats are not straightforward. One of the challenges in model–
centric security solutions is the diversity of models in machine learning and proposed solutions
are usually only applicable to a single model class. However, also the mere application of known
techniques such as cryptography to model operations instead of data is not trivial by any stretch. In
model-centric solutions calculating over encrypted values relies on homomorphic encryption [101].
In homomorphic encryption, one can perform mathematical operations on encrypted data without
the need to decrypt them. The model operates based on a joint effort by multiple parties which have
partial knowledge about the system. This way, the whole system operates correctly without leaking
sensitive information about its internal functionality and the data to any parties, including the mali-
cious ones. Shokri et al. [175] propose a deep–learning privacy persevering based on homomorphic
encryption. They propose a system that works on a server that is honest–but–curious. A variety of
homomorphic encryption applications, such as multi–party computation [46, 221], classification
over homomorphic encryption data [6], homomorphic encryption based neural networks [78] and
a homomorphic encryption version of k–means clustering [230]. Homomorphic encryption has
large potential in cloud–based machine-learning-as-a-service operations, but efficiency remains
a bottleneck. In this context, Ohrimenko et al. [175] is of interest. It proposes an alterative to
homomorphic encryption using a secure processor architecture based on SGX–processors in order
to perform various types of machine learning models including neural networks, SVM, matrix
factorization, decision–trees and k–means clustering. Their evaluations show that their solution
bears relatively low overhead compared to solutions based on homomorphic encryption.
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In addition to above confidentiality issues, the literature also proposes a number of solutions to
maintain the integrity of the model outcomes. Demontis et al. [48] present a secure SVM training
procedure they call sec–SVM, which learns more evenly–distributed features in linear classifiers.
Biggio et al. [15, 18] have a series of solutions of protective algorithms to safeguard the training stage
against data poisoning attacks. They use techniques such as random subspace method, bootstrap
aggregating and bagging ensembles to search for outliers during model training. In the testing and
inference stages most of the solutions are based on game theory, to model the potential behaviours
of attacker and defender [138]. Globerson et al. [79] use a min–max approach to analyse the impact
of all possible feature manipulations in the testing stage for SVM algorithm, further improved
by Teo et al. [212] to consider additional attack scenarios. Bru˙ckner et al. [26] suggest a novel
adversarial prediction system called Stackelberg Games and provide an algorithm based on Nash
equilibrium [25] called NashSVM. Bulò et al. [27] improve [26] with a randomized strategy selection
in their prediction system, thus improving the trade–off options between attack detection and false
alarm.
A quite different approach to preserve the integrity of the model operation is to purposely
account for adversarial settings in the training, testing and inferring stages. In these approaches
one retrains the model with adversarial samples [138, 209] so that the retrained model detects
anomalies [161, 238]. Goodfellow et al. [84] showed that this can be done reasonably efficiently,
reduce the false recognition rate. Of course, the inherent limitation of such approach relies on good
adversarial samples, in all permutations, and the methods is therefore not suited for unknown or
xero-day attack scenarios.
A final opportunity to protect against manipulated results is to correct the output of the model,
or at least warn for suspicious outputs. Gu et al. [88] construct a deep contractive network that
adds a penalty score in the model output, and approach mostly aimed at deep learning models.
Papernot et al. [179] propose a variant called defensive distillation to defend DNN models, but some
concerns about the effectiveness of this method remain [33] arguing about the security of [179].
7 OPEN PROBLEMS
There is a substantial amount of research being invested in each of the four FEAS aspects of building
trustworthy machine learning systems: fairness, ethics, auditability and safetry/security/privacy.
For each of the FEAS properties research challenges are being pursued by researchers world-wide,
and in this paper we want to highlight the open problems that exist in combining the resulting
research contributions to assist data and software engineers in building trustworthy AI-based
systems that fulfil the objectives of the policy frameworks discussed in Section 2.1.
Definitions and Implementation of Fairness. It is probably only natural that, in a fast emerging
research area such as trustworthy machine, learning terminology as well as key approaches have
not yet converged. This is most apparent with respect to the fairness definitions we surveyed in
Section 4.1, of which there are tens available [218]. It is theoretically impossible to satisfy all fairness
definitions at the same time [70]. This ambiguity in definitions can have serious implications. A
prime example is the well-known COMPAS case, which concerns an approach to prisoner recidivism
prediction used in several US states. The reported unfairness across ethnic groups was rebutted
by the software company based on its own, different, fairness definition [54, 65, 130]. In addition,
reliable practical usage of fairness definitions is not without challenges. Incorrect application of
fairness metrics may result in increased discrimination [122] and fairness metrics may be prone
to result instability, that is, a small change in training set may have noticeable impact on the
discrimination performance [70]. It is clear developers of machine learning systems can easily be
left confused about what definitions and associated algorithms and software to apply. There is
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a clear open problem in establishing an evidence-based implementation framework for fairness
in machine learning, covering definitions of metrics, their semantic subtleties with respect to the
discrimination they address, and the associated real-life implementation pitfalls for builders of
machine learning systems.
Integration of Trustworthiness and Accuracy. Machine learning algorithms are typically evaluated
with respect to accuracy and performance first, which is understandable if models are developed
isolated form the context of a real-life system. When using machine learning systems in real-life,
trustworthiness often becomes as or more important than accuracy and performance. If the FEAS
properties are considered too late in the design of algorithm and system, it may not be possible
to adjust the machine learning system satisfactory. There is no general mechanism to balance
accuracy and fairness for a set of ML models, so far the research on this topic is limited to specific
models and conditions. This implies a clear research challenge in trustworthy machine learning,
namely the integrated consideration of accuracy, performance and FEAS properties. This requires
development of trade-off approaches with respect to metrics representing the different objectives,
and the development of combined metrics. An associated open problem is the application of known
trustworthiness techniques to AI-based systems in general and machine-learning pipelines in
particular. In particular, systematic treatments such as advocated by [8] for designing dependable
systems needs to be further expanded for AI-based systems.
Data Engineering Pathways to Implement Policy Frameworks. The chain of trust introduced in
Section 3 asks a data engineer and system builder to consider a sequence of data processing steps,
which requires to transform the datasets in ones stage into a form that can be used as input to
a later stage. There currently are no well-established data and software engineering approaches
for such data transformation in relation to achieving the desired combined accuracy, performance
and FEAS properties. Not only are there gaps in knowledge of how individual data or processing
choices can affect the outcome, but the formal analysis of how to combine data and processing has
not been much explored. There is a need for concerted efforts in creating tools that help service
providers and machine learning system builders communicate and to help the latter engineer such
requirements into model design. This requires research in formalisation and tooling, which would
beneficially impact all stakeholders, from data scientists to service providers and end users.
Integration of Social Science Theories and Perspectives. In this paper, we discussed, on the one
hand, the various policy frameworks that are emerging and, on the other hand, the relevant FEAS
technologies that are available. To understand best how to bridge societal concerns and technological
possibilities research should be informed by multi-disciplinary perspectives. As an example, [214]
conducts initial research in this space in relation to trust in AI-based services. In that work,
social science theories for trust development are linked up with technology quality requirements.
Evidence-based research in social-science, psychology and human-computer interaction has the
potential to steer technology development and demonstrate its abilities or limitations in achieving
societal goals. Through quantitative as well as qualitative research the impact of technologies with
respect to their societal impact can be measured and better understood.
Education. Veale et al. [217] interview 27 public sector machine learning practitioners in five
countries about their understanding of public values such as fairness and accountability. Their
results confirm the disconnect between individual perspectives and technological properties and
point out the challenges that come with this in developing ethical machine learning systems.
Similarly, Holstein et al. [100] interview 25 machine learning practitioners and survey 267 more
to systematically investigate the implementation of fair machine learning by commercial product
teams. They also highlight the difference between real–world challenges and the provided solutions.
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Improving this situation could start with education of all stakeholders in machine learning systems,
including software and data engineers, for instance through curriculum development such as
demonstrated by [11].
8 CONCLUSION
This paper reviews the landscape and the most pertinent technologies required for building machine
learning systems that aim to fulfil the objectives of the many AI-related policy frameworks that are
emerging in relation to fairness and ethics. The paper identifies four main system properties to
implement such systems, namely fairness, explainability, auditability and safety/security (FEAS),
and provides a review of the main trends and technology categories in each of these. It surveys the
FEAS technologies with respect to all stages of the machine learning chain of trust, subdivided in
data-centric and model-centric technologies, respectively. The paper argues that in future work,
the emphasis should not only be on individual FEAS technologies but particularly on how these
technologies integrate with accuracy and efficiency consideration, can be translated in data and
software engineering tools that integrate concerns across the various stages of the machine learning
life cycle and in cross-disciplinary research to more profoundly connect FEAS technologies with
the AI policy framework objectives they ultimately set out to achieve.
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